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NONZERO-SUM SUBMODULAR MONOTONE-FOLLOWER GAMES:
EXISTENCE AND APPROXIMATION OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
JODI DIANETTI AND GIORGIO FERRARI
Abstract. We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular
control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with
submodular costs. We call these games monotone-follower games. In a not necessarily
Markovian setting, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria. Moreover, we introduce
a sequence of approximating games by restricting, for each n ∈ N, the players’ admissible
strategies to the set of Lipschitz processes with Lipschitz constant bounded by n. We prove
that, for each n ∈ N, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the approximating game and that the
sequence of Nash equilibria converges, in the Meyer-Zheng sense, to a weak (distributional)
Nash equilibrium of the original game of singular control. As a byproduct, such a convergence
also provides approximation results of the equilibrium values across the two classes of games.
We finally show how our results can be employed to prove existence of open-loop Nash
equilibria in an N-player stochastic differential game with singular controls, and we propose
an algorithm to determine a Nash equilibrium for the monotone-follower game.
Keywords: nonzero-sum games; singular control; submodular games; Meyer-Zheng topol-
ogy; Pontryagin maximum principle; Nash equilibrium; stochastic differential games; monotone-
follower problem.
AMS subject classification: 91A15, 06B23, 49J45, 60G07, 91A23, 93E20.
1. Introduction
We consider a class of stochastic N -player games over a finite time-horizon in which each
player, indexed by i = 1, ..., N , faces a multi-dimensional singular stochastic control problem
of monotone-follower type. On a complete probability space, consider a multi-dimensional
ca`dla`g (i.e., right-continuous with left limits) process L and, for i = 1, ..., N , multi-dimensional
continuous semimartingales f i with nonnegative components. Denote by F¯f,L+ the right-
continuous extension of the filtration generated by f = (f1, ..., fN ) and L, augmented by
the sets of zero probability. We call monotone-follower game the game in which each player
i is allowed to choose a multi-dimensional control Ai in the set of admissible strategies
A :=
{
F¯
f,L
+ -adapted processes with nondecreasing, nonnegative and ca`dla`g components
}
,
in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(Ai, A−i) := E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, A
i
t, A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , A
i
T , A
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,
where A−i := (Aj)j 6=i. Here T < ∞ and h
i and gi are suitable nonnegative convex cost
functions.
Next, we introduce a sequence of approximating games with regular controls in the following
way. For each n ∈ N, define the n-Lipschitz game as the game in which players are restricted
to pick a Lipschitz control in the set of admissible n-Lipschitz strategies
L(n) = {A ∈ A |A is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant smaller that n and A0 = 0} ,
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in order to minimize the cost functionals J i.
Our main contributions are the following.
(1) Under submodularity conditions on the functions hi and gi, we establish the existence
of Nash equilibria for the monotone-follower and the n-Lipschitz games.
(2) We show connections across these two classes of games. In particular:
(i) Any sequence obtained by choosing, for each n ∈ N, a Nash equilibrium of the
n-Lipschitz game is relatively compact in the Meyer-Zheng topology, and any
accumulation point of this sequence is the law of a weak Nash equilibrium of
the monotone-follower game (see Definition 4 below). That is, any accumulation
point is a Nash equilibrium on a suitable probability space on which are defined
processes f¯ and L¯ such that their joint law coincides with the joint law of f and
L.
(ii) The N -dimensional vector whose components are the expected costs associated
to any weak Nash equilibrium obtained through the previous approximation is a
Nash equilibrium payoff. Moreover, for each ε > 0, there exist nε ∈ N large enough
and a Nash equilibium of the nε-Lipschitz game which is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of the monotone-follower game.
Furthermore, we provide applications of our results to deduce existence of Nash equilibria
for a class of stochastic differential games with singular controls and non-Markovian random
costs. Also, in the spirit of [47], we construct an algorithm to determine a Nash equilibrium
of the monotone-follower game.
To the best of our knowledge, general existence and approximation results for Nash equilib-
ria in N -player non-Markovian stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control appear
in this paper for the first time.
1.1. Background literature. A singular stochastic control problem appears for the first
time in [6], where the problem of controlling the motion of a spaceship has been addressed.
Later on, examples of solvable singular stochastic control problems have been studied in [7].
Singular stochastic control problems of monotone-follower type have been introduced and
studied in [31] and [33]. A monotone-follower problem is the problem of tracking a stochastic
process by a nondecreasing process in order to optimize a certain performance criterion. Since
then, this class of problems has found many applications in economics and finance (see [5],
[15], [18], among many others), operations research (see, e.g., [24] and [28]), queuing theory
(see, e.g., [35]), mathematical biology (see, e.g., [1]), aerospace engineering (see, e.g., [41]),
and insurance mathematics (see [39], among others).
The literature on singular stochastic control problems experienced results on existence of
minima (or maxima) (see [21] and [29], among others), characterization of the optimizers
through first order conditions (see, e.g., [4], [5] and [13]), as well as connections to optimal
stopping problems (see, e.g., [33] or the more recent [10]) and to constrained backward sto-
chastic differential equations [11]. We also mention the recent work [37], as their version of
the monotone-follower problem is the single-agent version (in weak formulation) of our game.
The number of contributions on games of singular controls is still quite limited (see [19],
[22], [26], [27], [36], [45], [51]), although these problems have received an increasing interest
in the recent years. We briefly discuss here some of these works. In [45] it is determined
a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a monotone-follower game with symmetric payoffs (i.e.,
the cost functional is the same for all players), and it is provided a characterization of any
equilibria through a system of first order conditions. The same approach is also followed
in [22] for a game in which players are allowed to choose a regular control and a singular
control. Such a problem has been motivated by a question arising in public economic theory.
A general characterization of Nash equilibria through the Pontryagin Maximum Principle
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approach has been investigated in the recent [51] for regular-singular stochastic differential
games. Connections between nonzero-sum games of singular control and games of optimal
stopping have been tackled in [19]. It is also worth mentioning some recent works on mean field
games with singular controls (see [23] and [25]) and their connection to symmetric N -player
games (see [27]). A complete analysis of a Markovian N -player stochastic game in which
players can control an underlying diffusive dynamic through a control of bounded-variation
is provided in the recent [26]. There, the authors derive a Nash equilibrium by solving a
system of moving free boundary problems. General existence results for stochastic games
with multi-dimensional singular controls and non-Markovian costs were, however, missing in
the literature, and this has motivated our study.
1.2. Our results. We now provide more details on our results by discussing the ideas and
techniques of their proofs.
The existence results. Going back to the seminal ideas of J. Nash, a typical way to prove
existence of Nash equilibria is to show existence of a fixed point for the best-reply map. In
the spirit of [47], our strategy to prove existence of Nash equilibria in the monotone-follower
game and in the n-Lipschitz game is to exploit the submodular structure of our games in
order to apply a lattice-theoretical fixed point theorem: the Tarski’s fixed point theorem (see
[46]). We proceed as follows. We first endow the spaces of admissible strategies A and L(n)
(defined above) with a lattice structure. While the lattice L(n) is complete, the same does
not hold true for A. To overcome this problem, we show that, under suitable assumptions,
each “reasonable” strategy lives in a bounded subset of A, and we restrict our analysis to this
subset. We then prove that the best-reply maps are non empty. To accomplish this task in the
n-Lipschitz game, we employ the so-called classical direct method. Indeed, since each strategy
is forced to be n-Lipschitz, then the sequence of time-derivatives of any minimizing sequence
is bounded in L2. Hence, Banach-Saks’ theorem, together with the lower semi-continuity and
the convexity of the costs, allows to conclude existence of the minima. On the other hand,
for the monotone-follower game we use some more recent techniques already employed to
prove existence of optimizers in singular stochastic control problems (see [5]). Assuming a
uniform coercivity condition on the costs (which has to be, anyway, necessarily satisfied in
any Nash equilibria; see Remark 2.5 below) we can use a theorem by Y.M. Kabanov (see
Lemma 3.5 in [30]) which gives relative sequential compactness, in the Cesa`ro sense, of any
minimizing sequence. Then, exploiting again the lower semi-continuity and the convexity of
the cost functions, we conclude existence of the minima. Next, we show that the best-reply
maps preserve the order in the spaces of admissible strategies, and for this the submodular
condition is essential. The existence then follows by invoking Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
Our result also generalizes to the monotone-follower game in which players are allowed to
choose both a regular control and a singular control (see Remark 2.7). Moreover, some of our
assumptions are not needed if we impose finite-fuel constraints (see Remark 2.6).
It is worth stressing that our proof strongly hinges on the submodularity assumption, which,
however, is a typical requirement in many problems arising in applications (see, e.g., [43], [47],
[49], or the books [48] and [50] and the references therein).
The approximation results. Singular control problems naturally arise to overcome the ill-
posedness of standard stochastic control problems in which the control linearly affects the
dynamics of the state variable, and the cost of control is proportional to the effort. Some kind
of connection between regular control problems with the linear structure described above and
singular control problems is then expected, and actually already discussed in the literature
(see, e.g, the early [41] for an analytical approach, and [37] for a probabilistic approach). In
Theorem 21 of [37], it is shown that any sequence obtained by choosing, for each n ∈ N, a
minimizer of the monotone-follower problem when the class of admissible controls is restricted
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to the set of n-Lipschitz controls, suitably approximates a (weak) optimal solution to the
original monotone-follower problem.
We prove that any sequence of Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz game is weakly relatively
compact, and that any accumulation point is a weak Nash equilibrium of the monotone-
follower game. We first show that this sequence satisfies a tightness criterion for the Meyer-
Zheng topology. Then, we prove that any Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game necessarily
satisfies a system of stochastic equations. After changing the underlying probability space by
a Skorokhod representation, we pass to the limit in these systems of equations and we deduce
that any accumulation point solves a new system of stochastic equations. These equations
can be viewed as a version of the Pontryagin maximum principle, and they are sufficient to
ensure that the limit point is a Nash equilibrium in the new probability space, hence a weak
Nash equilibrium.
As a byproduct of this result, we are able to show that, for each ε > 0, there exists n ∈ N
large enough such that the Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of the monotone-follower game. This gives a clearer interpretation of the weak Nash equilib-
rium found through the approximation: the N -dimensional vector whose components are the
expected costs associated to the weak Nash equilibrium is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium payoff
(as defined in [12]) of the monotone-follower game.
Applications and examples. Our existence result applies to deduce existence of open-loop
Nash equilibria in stochastic differential games with singular controls and non-Markovian
random costs, whenever a certain structure is preserved by the dynamics. For the sake of
illustration, we consider the case in which the dynamics of the state variable of each player are
a linearly controlled geometric Brownian motion and a linearly controlled Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process.
Moreover, we consider the algorithm introduced by Topkis (see Algorithm II in [47]) for
submodular games: given as initial point the constantly null profile strategy, this algorithm
consists of an iteration of the best-reply map. We show that, also in our setting, this algorithm
converges to a Nash equilibrium.
1.3. Organization of the paper. In Section 2.1 we introduce the monotone-follower game.
Sections 2.2 and 3 are devoted to the existence theorems of Nash equilibria for the submodular
monotone-follower game and for the n-Lipschitz game, respectively. The approximation re-
sults are contained in Section 4. The application of our result to suitable stochastic differential
games is provided in Section 5, together with the proof of the convergence to a Nash equilib-
rium of a certain algorithm. In Appendix A we recall some results about the Meyer-Zheng
topology.
1.4. Notations. In the rest of this paper, for m ∈ N and x, y ∈ Rm, we denote by xy the
scalar product in Rm, as well as by |·| the Euclidean norm in Rm. For x, y ∈ Rm and c ∈ R, we
will write x ≤ y if xℓ ≤ yℓ for each ℓ = 1, ...,m, as well as x ≤ c if xℓ ≤ c for each ℓ = 1, ...,m.
Moreover, we set x ∧ y := (x1 ∧ y1, ..., xm ∧ ym) and x ∨ y := (x1 ∨ y1, ..., xm ∨ ym), where
xℓ ∧ yℓ := min{xℓ, yℓ} and xℓ ∨ yℓ := max{xℓ, yℓ} for each ℓ = 1, ...,m. Finally, for d, N ∈ N,
and a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ RNd, for each i = 1, ..., N set a−i := (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., aN ) ∈ R(N−1)d
and, for v ∈ Rd, set (v, a−i) := (a1, ..., ai−1, v, ai+1, ..., aN ) ∈ RNd.
2. The Monotone-Follower Game
2.1. Definition of the Monotone-Follower Game. Fix a complete probability space
(Ω,F ,P), a finite time horizon T ∈ (0,∞), an integer N ≥ 2 and k, d ∈ N. Consider a
ca`dla`g process L : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rk, and, for i = 1, ..., N , assume to be given continuous semi-
martingales f i : Ω × [0, T ] → Rd+, and set f := (f
1, ..., fN ). Denote by F¯f,L+ = {F¯
f,L
t+ }t∈[0,T ]
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the right-continuous extension of the filtration generated by f and L, augmented by the P-null
sets.
Define the space of admissible strategies
(2.1) A :=
{
V : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd
∣∣∣∣ V is an F¯f,L+ -adapted ca`dla`g process, withnondecreasing and nonnegative components
}
,
and let AN :=
⊗N
i=1A denote the set of admissible profile strategies. In order to avoid
confusion, in the following we will denote profile strategies in bold letters.
For each i = 1, ..., N , consider measurable functions hi, gi : Rk × RNd → [0,∞). We define
the monotone-follower game as the game in which each player i ∈ {1, ..., N} is allowed to
choose an admissible strategy Ai ∈ A in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(Ai, A−i) :=E[Ci(f, L,A)] := E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+ g
i(LT ,AT ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,
where A−i := (Aj)j 6=i and A := (A
i, A−i) ∈ AN . Here and in the sequel the integrals with
respect to Ai are defined by∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t := f
i
0A
i
0 +
∫ T
0
f it dA
i
t =
d∑
ℓ=1
f ℓ,i0 A
ℓ,i
0 +
d∑
ℓ=1
∫ T
0
f ℓt dA
ℓ,i
t ,
where the integrals on the right hand side are intended in the standard Lebesgue-Stieltjes
sense on the interval (0, T ].
We recall the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. An admissible profile strategy A¯ ∈ AN is a Nash equilibrium if, for every
i = 1, ..., N , we have J i(A¯) <∞ and
J i(A¯i, A¯−i) ≤ J i(V i, A¯−i), for every V i ∈ A.
Letting 2A denote the set of all subset of A, for each i = 1, ..., N define the best-reply map
Ri : AN → 2A by
(2.2) Ri(A) := argmin
V i∈A
J i(V i, A−i).
Observe that the maps Ri are constant in the variable Ai. Moreover define the map
(2.3) R := (R1, ..., RN ) : AN →
N⊗
i=1
2A,
and notice that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of fixed points of the map R
which have finite values; that is, the set of A¯ ∈ AN such that A¯ ∈ R(A¯) and J i(A¯) <∞ for
every i = 1, ..., N .
Remark 2.1. The notion of equilibrium introduced above is that of the so-called Open-Loop
Nash equilibrium. We focus on this specific class of equilibria since serious conceptual –
so far unsolved – problems arise when one tries to define a game of singular controls with
Closed-Loop strategies (see [3] for a discussion, and also [22] and [45]).
We now specify the structural hypothesis on the costs.
Assumption 2.2. For each i = 1, ..., N and for φi ∈ {hi, gi} assume that:
(1) for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk × R(N−1)d, the function φi(l, ·, a−i) is lower semi-continuous,
and strictly convex;
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(2) for each l ∈ Rk the function φi(l, ·, ·) has decreasing differences in (ai, a−i), i.e.
φi(l, a¯i, a−i)− φi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ φi(l, a¯i, a¯−i)− φi(l, ai, a¯−i),
for each a, a¯ ∈ RNd such that a¯ ≥ a;
(3) for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk × R(N−1)d, the function φi(l, ·, a−i) is submodular, i.e.
φi(l, a¯i, a−i) + φi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ φi(l, a¯i ∧ ai, a−i) + φi(l, a¯i ∨ ai, a−i),
for each a, a¯ ∈ RNd.
Under Conditions 2 and 3 of Assumption 2.2 we refer to the game introduced above as to the
submodular monotone-follower game (see [47] for a static deterministic N -player submodular
game, and Theorem 2.6.1 and Corollary 2.6.1 at p. 44 in [48] for further discussion on these
conditions). The submodular structure of our game will play a fundamental role in the
following.
2.2. Existence of Nash Equilibria in the Submodular Monotone-Follower Game.
Define the space of extended admissible strategies
(2.4) A∞ :=
{
V : Ω× [0, T ]→ [0,∞]d
∣∣∣∣V is an F¯f,L+ -adapted ca`dla`g process,with nondecreasing components
}
,
and, on it, we define the order relation 4 such that, for V,U ∈ A∞, one has
V 4 U ⇐⇒ Vt ≤ Ut ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
Moreover, we can endow the space A∞ with a lattice structure, defining the processes V ∧U
and V ∨ U as
(V ∧ U)t := Vt ∧ Ut and (V ∨ U)t := Vt ∨ Ut ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
In the same way, on the set of extended profile strategies AN∞ :=
⊗N
i=1A∞, define, for A,B ∈
AN∞, an order relation 4
N by
A 4N B ⇐⇒ Ai 4 Bi ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N},
together with the lattice structure
A ∧B := (A1 ∧B1, ..., AN ∧BN ) and A ∨B := (A1 ∨B1, ..., AN ∨BN ).
We now provide an existence result for the submodular monotone-follower game.
Theorem 2.3. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and assume that the following uniform coercivity
condition is satisfied: there exist two constants K,κ > 0 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
(2.5) J i(Ai, A−i) ≥ κE[|AiT |] for all A ∈ A
N with E[|AiT |] ≥ K.
Suppose, moreover, that there exists a constant M > 0 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
(2.6) for all A ∈ AN there exists ri(A) ∈ A such that J i(ri(A), A−i) ≤M.
Then the set of Nash equilibria F ⊂ AN is non empty, and the partially ordered set (F,4N )
is a complete lattice.
Proof. Our aim is to prove existence of a Nash equilibrium by applying Tarski’s fixed point
theorem (see Theorem 1 in [46]) to the map R (cf. (2.3)). For this, the assumption on the
submodularity of hi and gi will play a crucial role.
First of all, recalling k, K and M from (2.5) and (2.6), define the constant w := 2M
κ
∨K,
and introduce the set of restricted admissible strategies
(2.7) A(w) := {A ∈ A |E[AlT ] ≤ w, ∀ l = 1, ..., d },
and the set of restricted profile strategies as A(w)N :=
⊗N
i=1A(w). In the following steps we
will identify the proper framework allowing us to apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
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(Step 1) The best-reply maps Ri : AN → A(w) are well defined.
Fix i and take A ∈ AN . We have to prove that there exists a unique B ∈ A such that
J i(B,A−i) = min
V ∈A
J i(V,A−i),
and, moreover, that B ∈ A(w). Clearly, by (2.2), we have B = {Ri(A)t}t∈[0,T ].
Let {V j}j∈N ⊂ A be a minimizing sequence for the functional J
i(·, A−i). Thanks to the
coercivity conditions (2.5) on the costs, we deduce that
sup
j∈N
E[|V jT |] <∞.
We can then use (a minimal adjustment of) Lemma 3.5 in [30], to find a ca`dla`g, nondecreasing,
nonnegative, F¯f,L+ -adapted process B, and a subsequence of {V
j}j∈N (not relabeled) such that,
P-a.s.,
(2.8) lim
m
∫
[0,T ]
ϕt dB
m
t =
∫
[0,T ]
ϕt dBt ∀ϕ ∈ Cb([0, T ];R
d) and lim
m
BmT = BT ,
where we set, P-a.s.
(2.9) Bmt :=
1
m
m∑
j=1
V jt , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, from the limit in (2.8) we have that there exists a P-null set N such that, for each
ω ∈ Ω \ N there exists a subset I(ω) ⊂ [0, T ) of null Lebesgue measure, such that
lim
m
Bmt (ω) = Bt(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \ N and t ∈ [0, T ] \ I(ω).
The latter convergence allows us to invoke Fatou’s lemma which, together with the limit in
(2.8) and thanks to the lower semi-continuity of the costs, allows us to conclude that
J i(B,A−i) ≤ lim inf
m
J i(Bm, A−i) ≤ lim inf
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
J i(V j , A−i) = min
V ∈A
J i(V,A−i),
where we have used the convexity of hi and gi and the minimizing property of V j . Hence B is
a minimizer for J i(·, A−i); in fact, B is the unique minimizer of J i(·, A−i) by strict convexity
of the costs.
It remains to prove that B ∈ A(w), and to accomplish that we argue by contradiction. If
there exists l ∈ {1, ..., d} such that E[BlT ] ≥ w =
2M
κ
∨K, then we have E[|BT |] ≥
2M
κ
∨ K
and hence, by the coercivity condition (2.5) together with (2.6), we deduce that
J i(B,A−i) ≥ κE[|BT |] ≥ 2M > J
i(ri(A), A−i),
which contradicts the optimality of B.
(Step 2) The best-reply maps Ri are increasing, i.e. if A, A¯ ∈ AN are such that A 4N A¯,
then Ri(A) 4 Ri(A¯).
First of all, observe that, by an integration by parts (see, e.g., Corollary 2 at p. 68 in [44]),
the cost functional rewrites as
J i(Ai, A−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+ g
i (LT ,AT )−
∫ T
0
Ait− df
i
t + f
i
TA
i
T
]
,(2.10)
where Ait− denotes the left-limit of A
i
t. Thanks to the optimality of R
i(A) we have the
inequality
(2.11) J i(Ri(A¯) ∧Ri(A), A−i)−J i(Ri(A),A−i) ≥ 0,
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which by (2.10) and setting Ri := Ri(A) and R¯i := Ri(A¯), can be rewritten as
E
[∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, R
i
t ∧ R¯
i
t, A
−i
t )− h
i(Lt, R
i
t, A
−i
t )
)
dt
]
− E
[∫ T
0
(Rit− ∧ R¯
i
t− −R
i
t−) df
i
t
]
+E
[
gi(LT , R
i
T ∧ R¯
i
T , A
−i
T )− g
i(LT , R
i
T , A
−i
T )
]
+ E
[
f iT (R
i
T ∧ R¯
i
T −R
i
T )
]
≥ 0,
By the submodularity Condition 3 in Assumption 2.2, we have
E
[∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, R
i
t ∧ R¯
i
t, A
−i
t )− h
i(Lt, R
i
t, A
−i
t )
)
dt
]
(2.12)
≤ E
[∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, R¯
i
t, A
−i
t )− h
i(Lt, R
i
t ∨ R¯
i
t, A
−i
t )
)
dt
]
,
and
E
[
gi(LT , R
i
T ∧ R¯
i
T , A
−i
T )− g
i(LT , R
i
T , A
−i
T )
]
(2.13)
≤ E
[
gi(LT , R¯
i
T , A
−i
T )− g
i(LT , R
i
T ∨ R¯
i
T , A
−i
T )
]
.
Moreover, one can easily verify that
(2.14) E
[∫ T
0
(Rit− ∧ R¯
i
t− −R
i
t−) df
i
t
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(R¯it− −R
i
t− ∨ R¯
i
t−) df
i
t
]
and
(2.15) E
[
f iT (R
i
T ∧ R¯
i
T −R
i
T )
]
= E
[
f iT (R¯
i
T −R
i
T ∨ R¯
i
T )
]
.
Using (2.12)-(2.15) we obtain
J i(Ri(A¯) ∧Ri(A), A−i)− J i(Ri(A), A−i) ≤ J i(Ri(A¯), A−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A−i),
so that, by (2.11), we deduce that
(2.16) J i(Ri(A¯), A−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A−i) ≥ 0.
Now, by Condition 2 in Assumption 2.2, we have
J i(Ri(A¯), A¯−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A¯−i) ≥ J i(Ri(A¯), A−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A−i),
and finally, by (2.16), we conclude that
J i(Ri(A¯), A¯−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A¯−i) ≥ 0.
Hence Ri(A) ∨ Ri(A¯) minimizes J i(·, A¯−i) as well as Ri(A¯) and, by uniqueness, it must be
Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯) = Ri(A¯). That is Ri(A¯) 4 Ri(A), which shows the claimed monotonicity.
(Step 3) The lattices (AN∞,4
N ) and (A∞,4) are complete.
We prove the claim only for the lattice (AN∞,4
N ), since an analogous rationale applies to
show that the lattice (A∞,4) is complete.
To prove that the lattice (AN∞,4
N ) is complete we have to show that each subset of AN∞
has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. We now prove only the existence of a
least upper bound, since the existence of a greatest lower bound follows by similar arguments.
Consider a subset {Aj}j∈I of A
N
∞, where I is a set of indexes. Define Q := ([0, T ]∩Q)∪{T}.
For each q ∈ Q we set
(2.17) S˜q := ess sup
j∈I
Ajq,
and we recall that there exists a countable subset Iq of I such that
(2.18) S˜q = sup
j∈Iq
Ajq.
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Define next the right-continuous process S : Ω× [0, T ]→ [0,∞]Nd by
(2.19) ST := S˜T , and St := inf{ S˜q | q > t, q ∈ Q}, for t < T.
Observe that S is F¯f,L+ -adapted by right-continuity of the filtration. Hence, S lies in A
N
∞, and
clearly Aj 4N S for each j ∈ I.
Consider next an element B of AN∞ such that A
j 4N B for each j ∈ I. For q ∈ Q and
j ∈ Iq there exists a P-null set M
j
q such that A
j
q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \M
j
q. Defining
then Mq :=
⋃
j∈Iq
Mjq, we have A
j
q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \ Mq and j ∈ Iq, which, by
(2.18), implies that S˜q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \ Mq. Finally, introducing the P-null set
M :=
⋃
q∈QMq, we have S˜q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω\M and q ∈ Q, and, by right-continuity,
we deduce that S 4N B. Thus, S is the least upper bound of {Aj}j∈I .
(Step 4) There exist increasing maps R¯i : AN∞ → A(w) such that R¯
i(A) = Ri(A) for each
A ∈ AN .
For each A ∈ AN∞, define R¯
i(A) as the least upper bound of the set {Ri(V) |V ∈ AN ,V 4N
A} in the complete lattice (A∞,4). If A ∈ A
N , then Ri(A) ∈ {Ri(V) |V ∈ AN ,V 4N A}
and, since Ri is increasing, Ri(V) 4 Ri(A) for each V ∈ AN such that V 4N A, which
implies that R¯i(A) = Ri(A). Moreover, if A, B ∈ AN∞ are such that A 4
N B, then we
have {V ∈ AN ,V 4N A} ⊂ {V ∈ AN ,V 4N B} and hence that R¯i(A) 4 R¯i(B). It only
remains to prove that R¯i(A) ∈ A(w). In order to accomplish that, we observe that, for each
V, V′ ∈ AN such that V, V′ 4N A we have that V ∨V′ 4N A and, since Ri is increasing,
Ri(V) ∨ Ri(V′) 4 Ri(V ∨V′); that is, the set {Ri(V) |V ∈ AN ,V 4N A} is closed under
taking maxima. This implies that there exists a sequence {Vj}j∈N ⊂ {V ∈ A
N ,V 4N A}
such that the sequence {Ri(Vj)T }j∈N is increasing and, moreover,
(2.20) R¯i(A)T = lim
j
Ri(Vj)T , P-a.s., and E[R¯
i(A)T ] = lim
j
E[Ri(Vj)T ],
where the latter equality is due to the monotone convergence theorem. Finally, by Step 1 we
have that Ri(Vj) ∈ A(w) for each j ∈ N, which, by (2.20), implies that R¯i(A) ∈ A(w).
(Step 5) Existence of Nash equilibria.
By the previous steps the lattice (AN∞,4
N ) is complete and the map R¯ := (R¯1, ..., R¯N ) from
the set of extended profile strategies AN∞ into itself is monotone increasing. Then, by Tarski’s
fixed point theorem (see [46], Theorem 1), the set of fixed point of the map R¯ is a non empty
complete lattice. Now, by Step 4, the image of the map R¯ is contained in A(w)N , and the
map R¯ coincides with the map R on A(w)N . This implies that the set of fixed points of R
is equal to the set of fixed point of R¯, and since such a set coincides with the set of Nash
equilibria, the proof is completed. 
2.3. Some Remarks. In this subsection we collect some remarks concerning assumptions
and extensions of the previous theorem.
Remark 2.4 (Comments on the Conditions of Theorem 2.3). A few comments are worth
being done.
(1) Condition (2.5) is satisfied if, for example, there exists a constant c > 0 such that
P
[
f it ≥ c, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
]
= 1,
or if gi are such that gi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ κ |ai|.
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(2) The role of Condition (2.6) is to force Nash equilibria, whenever they exist, to live in
the bounded subset AN (w) of AN . If there exist measurable functions H,G : Rk →
[0,∞) such that, for each i = 1, ..., N and for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk × R(N−1)d, we have
hi(l, 0, a−i) ≤ H(l) and gi(l, 0, a−i) ≤ G(l), with
E
[∫ T
0
H(Ls) ds +G(LT )
]
<∞,
then Condition (2.6) is satisfies with ri(A) = 0.
Remark 2.5. Consider the case N = 2, d = 1. The costs relative to Player 1 are f1 = h1 =
0, g1(l, a1, a2) = e−a
1
(2−e−a
2
), while the costs of Player 2 can be generic functions satisfying
our requirements. Then, all the assumptions of Theorem 2.3 are satisfied, with the exception
of the coercivity condition (2.5), which is not satisfied by J 1. If now (Aˆ1, Aˆ2) were a Nash
equilibrium, then for the first player we could write
0 < E[e−Aˆ
1
T (2− e−Aˆ
2
T )] ≤ inf
n∈N
E[e−n(2− e−Aˆ
2
T )] = 0,
which is clearly a contradiction. This example shows that, at least in the Nash equilibria, the
coercivity condition (2.5) is necessarily satisfied.
Remark 2.6 (Finite-Fuel Constraint). Many models in the literature on monotone-follower
problems enjoy a so-called finite fuel constraint (see e.g. [32] for a seminal paper, and the more
recent [4] and [16]). This can be realized by requiring that the admissible control strategies stay
bounded either P-a.s. or in expectation. In our game, if we suppose that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
the strategies of player i belongs to the set A(wi) := {A ∈ A |E[AlT ] ≤ w
i, ∀ l = 1, ..., d }, a
proof similar to that of Theorem 2.3 still shows existence of Nash equilibria without need of
Conditions 2.5 and 2.6.
Remark 2.7 (An Extension of Theorem 2.3 with Regular-Singular Controls). We here discuss
how to extend Theorem 2.3 to a game in which players can choose both a regular and a singular
control.
Fix a square integrable random variable Θ and define the space of regular controls U as the
set of Rd-valued F¯f,L+ -progressively measurable processes u such that |ut| ≤ Θ P⊗ dt− a.e. We
consider the game of regular-singular controls, in which each player i ∈ {1, ..., N} is allowed to
choose an admissible strategy Xi = (ui, Ai) ∈ U ×A in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(Xi,X−i) := E
[∫ T
0
hi(Lt,X
1
t , ...,X
N
t ) dt+ g
i(LT ,AT ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
.
Define on U the order relation 4 by setting, for u, v ∈ U , u 4 v if and only if ut ≤ vt P⊗ dt-
a.e. Next, consider on the lattice (U ,4) the topology I of intervals (see, e.g., p. 250 in [9]);
that is, the topology for which the topology of closed sets is generated by the family of sets
Iz := {u ∈ U : u 4 z} and I
z := {u ∈ U : z 4 u} for z ∈ U . Since the topology I is included
in the weak topology of L2(Ω× [0, T ];Rd) and U is bounded, then U is compact in the topology
I. Therefore, by a characterization of complete lattices (see Theorem 20 at p. 250 in [9]), it
follows that the lattice (U ,4) is complete. Then, existence of Nash equilibria follows proceding
as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
3. The n-Lipschitz Game
In the notation of Section 2, for each n ∈ N, define the space of n-Lipschitz strategies
L(n) = {A ∈ A |A is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant smaller that n and A0 = 0} ,
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and the space of n-Lipschitz profile strategies as LN (n) :=
⊗N
i=1 L(n). The set L(n) (resp.
LN (n)) inherits from A (resp. AN ) the order relation 4 (resp. 4N ) together with the associ-
ated lattice structure.
For each n ∈ N, the set of n-Lipschitz profile strategies LN (n), together with the cost
functionals J i, define a game to which we will refer to as the n-Lipschitz game. We say that
an n-Lipschitz profile strategy A ∈ LN (n) is a Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game if,
for each i = 1, ..., N , we have J i(A) <∞ and
J i(Ai, A−i) ≤ J i(V i, A−i), for every V i ∈ L(n).
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of Nash Equilibria for the Submodular n-Lipschitz Game). Let
Assumption 2.2 hold. Then, for each n ∈ N, the set of Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz
game F ⊂ LN (n) is non empty, and the partially ordered set (F,4N ) is a complete lattice.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 2.3, we identify the proper framework in order to apply
Tarski’s fixed point theorem. The completeness of the lattice (LN (n),4N ) follows by observing
that the least upper bound (as well as the greatest lower bound) of any subset is still Lipschitz
with Lipschitz constant bounded by n. Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 26 at p. 109
in [37], we deduce that, for each i = 1, ..., N and each A ∈ LN (n), there exists a unique (by
strict convexity of the costs) Ri(A) ∈ L(n) such that
J i(Ri(A), A−i) = min
V ∈L(n)
J i(V,A−i).
By employing arguments as those in the Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 2.3 we conclude that
the map R = (R1, ..., RN ) : LN (n) → LN (n) is monotone increasing in the complete lattice
(LN (n),4N ). Then, the thesis of the theorem follows from Tarski’s fixed point theorem. 
4. Existence and Approximation of Weak Nash Equilibria in the Submodular
Monotone-Follower Game
In this section we will investigate connections between the monotone-follower game and the
n-Lipschitz games.
4.1. Weak Formulation of the Monotone-Follower Game. For T ∈ (0,∞) and an
arbitrary m ∈ N, we introduce the following measurable spaces:
• Cm+ denotes the set of R
m-valued continuous function on [0, T ] with nonnegative com-
ponents, endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the uniform convergence
norm;
• Dm denotes the Skorokhod space of Rm-valued ca`dla`g functions, defined on [0, T ],
endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the Skorokhod topology;
• Dm↑ denotes the Skorokhod space of R
m-valued nondecreasing, nonnegative ca`dla`g
functions, defined on [0, T ], endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the Sko-
rokhod topology.
Also, let P(Cm+ ), P(D
m) and P(Dm↑ ) denote the set of probability measures on the Borel
σ-algebras of Cm+ , D
m and Dm↑ , respectively. Finally, denote by P(C
m
+ ×D
m ×Dm↑ ) the set of
probability measures on the product σ-algebra.
Moreover, denote by (πf , πL) : C
Nd
+ × D
k × [0, T ] → RNd+k the canonical projection, i.e.,
set (πf , πL)t(f, L) = (ft, Lt) for each (f, L) ∈ C
Nd
+ ×D
k and t ∈ [0, T ]. Also, for a probability
measure P ∈ P(CNd+ × D
k), denote by F¯
πf ,πL
+ the right continuous extension of the filtration
on CNd+ ×D
k generated by the canonical projections πf and πL, augmented by the P-null sets.
We now give a weak formulation of the monotone-follower game. Assume to be given a
distribution P0 ∈ P(C
Nd
+ ×D
k) such that the projection process πf : C
Nd
+ ×D
k× [0, T ]→ RNd
is a semimartingale with respect to the filtration F¯
πf ,πL
+ .
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Definition 2. We call a basis a 5-tuple β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) such that (Ω,F ,P) is a complete
probability space, L is an Rk-valued ca`dla`g process, f = (f1, ..., fN ) is an RNd-valued contin-
uous, nonnegative semimartingale with respect to the filtration F¯f,L+ , and P ◦ (f, L)
−1 = P0.
For each basis β, we then give the relative notion of admissible strategy.
Definition 3. Given a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), an admissible strategy associated to β is an
Rd-valued ca`dla`g, nondecreasing, nonnegative process on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). We
denote by Aβ the set of admissible strategies associated to the basis β. Moreover, we define
the space of admissible profile strategies associated to the basis β as ANβ :=
⊗N
i=1Aβ.
Given a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), for each i ∈ {1, ..., N} and each admissible strategy
Ai ∈ Aβ we define the cost functionals
J iβ(A
i, A−i) := EP[Ci(f, L,A)] = EP
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+ g
i(LT ,AT ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,
where A−i := (Aj)j 6=i, A := (A
i, A−i) and EP denotes the expectation under the probability
measure P.
We finally introduce a notion of equilibrium that we will refer to as weak Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Weak Nash Equilibrium). Given a basis β¯ and an admissible profile strategy
A¯ ∈ AN
β¯
, we say that the couple (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium if, for every i = 1, ..., N ,
we have
J i
β¯
(A¯i, A¯−i) ≤ J i
β¯
(V i, A¯−i), for every V i ∈ Aβ¯.
4.2. Assumptions and a Preliminary Lemma. In this subsection we specify the main
assumptions of this section, we introduce some notations, and we provide a preliminary lemma.
Assumption 4.1. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and, for each i = 1, ..., N , assume that:
(1) gi and hi are continuous and continuously differentiable in the variable ai ∈ Rd.
(2) There exist γ1, γ2 > 1 such that the d-dimensional gradients ∇ihi and ∇igi of the
functions hi and gi with respect to the (d-dimensional) variable ai satisfy
(4.1) |∇ih
i(l, a)|+ |∇ig
i(l, a)| ≤ C(1 + |l|γ1 + |a|γ2),
for each l ∈ Rk and a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ RNd.
Moreover, there exist measurable functions H i, Gi : Rk → R such that hi(l, 0, a−i) ≤
H i(l) and gi(l, 0, a−i) ≤ Gi(l), with
(4.2) EP0
[∫ T
0
|H i((πL)s)|
q ds+ |Gi((πL)T )|
q
]
<∞
and
(4.3) EP0
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
(|(πL)s|
αγ1p + |(πf )s|
αp )
]
<∞,
where q := αmax{γ2 p, p/(p− 1)} for some p, α > 1.
(3) There exists a constant c > 0 such that
(4.4) P0
[
(πf )
i
t ≥ c, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ i = 1, ..., N
]
= 1,
and the total conditional variation (see definition (A.2) in the Appendix A) of πL over
the interval [0, T ] is finite; that is, V P0T (πL) <∞ .
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For a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), a profile strategy A = (A1, ..., AN ) ∈ ANβ and an index
i ∈ {1, ..., N}, we define the continuous (non adapted) subgradient process ∂Ci(f, L,A) :
Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd by setting
(4.5) ∂Ci(f, L,A)t :=
∫ T
t
∇ih
i(Lt,At) dt+∇ig
i(LT ,AT ) + f
i
t , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
Furthermore, if A is such that J iβ(A) < ∞ for a certain i ∈ {1, ..., N}, then, exploiting the
convexity of hi and gi and integrating by parts, we obtain the following subgradient inequality
(4.6) J iβ(B
i, A−i)− J iβ(A
i, A−i) ≥ EP
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∂Cit(dB
i
t − dA
i
t)
]
, for each Bi ∈ Aβ.
Fix a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) and recall that F¯f,L+ = {F¯
f,L
t+ }t∈[0,T ] is the right-continuous
extension of the filtration generated by f and L, augmented by the P-null sets. For each n ∈ N,
consider a Nash equilibrium An = (A1,n, ..., AN,n) of the n-Lipschitz game as in Theorem 3.1.
The next lemma shows that any Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschtz game satisfy certain first
order conditions. The proof of this claim follows arguments analogus to those used in the
proof of Proposition 27 in [37].
Lemma 4.2. For every n ∈ N and every i = 1, ..., N , set ∂Ci,n := ∂Ci(f, L,An). Then,
under Assumption 4.1, defining 1 := (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rd, we have
(4.7)
EP
[∫ T
0
∂Ci,nt dA
i,n
t
]
= −nEP
[∫ T
0
(∂Ci,nt )
− 1 dt
]
and lim
n
EP
[∫ T
0
(∂Ci,nt )
− dt
]
= 0.
4.3. Existence and Approximation of Weak Nash Equilibria. We now state and prove
the main result of this section, which can be thought of as a game-theoretic version of Theorem
21 in [37].
For an arbitrary m ∈ N, consider on the space Cm+ the topology given by the convergence in
the uniform norm. Furthermore, on the space Dm consider the pseudopath topology τTpp; that
is, the topology on Dm induced by the convergence in the measure dt + δT on the interval
[0, T ], where dt denotes the Lebesgue measure, and δT denotes the Dirac measure at the
terminal time T . The space Dm↑ is a closed subset of the topological space (D
m, τTpp), and
the Borel σ-algebra induced by the topology τTpp, coincides with the σ-algebra induced by
the Skorokhod topology (see also the Appendix in [37]). Notice that the topological spaces
(Dm, τTpp) and (D
m
↑ , τ
T
pp) are separable, but not Polish (see, e.g., [42]). Finally, on the product
space CNd+ ×D
k ×DNd↑ , consider the product topology, and on P(C
Nd
+ ×D
k ×DNd↑ ) consider
the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
Fix a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) and consider, for each n ∈ N, a Nash equilibrium An =
(A1,n, ..., AN,n) of the n-Lipschitz game as in Theorem 3.1. Define, for n ∈ N, the law
Pn := P◦ (f, L,An)−1 in P(CNd+ ×D
k×DNd↑ ); with a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer
to the law Pn as the law of the Nash equilibrium An. We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumption 4.1 the following statements hold.
(1) The sequence {Pn}n∈N of the laws of the Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz games is
weakly relatively compact in P(CNd+ ×D
k ×DNd↑ ).
(2) Any accumulation point P¯ is the law of a weak Nash equilibrium of the monotone-
follower game; that is, there exist a basis β¯ = (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯, f¯ , L¯) and an admissible profile
strategy A¯ ∈ AN
β¯
, such that (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium of the monotone-follower
game and P¯ = Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, A¯)−1.
Proof. We prove the two claims of the theorem separately.
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Proof of Claim 1. By assumption we have V PT (L) < ∞. Moreover, by employing arguments
similar to those in the proof of Proposition 28 at p. 110 in [37], we find
(4.8) sup
n
EP [|AnT |
q] <∞,
where q > 1 is as in Assumption 4.1. Therefore, from Lemma A.1, we can deduce that the
sequence {An}n∈N is tight in P(D
Nd
↑ ), and that L in tight in P(D
k). Furthermore, since the
space CNd+ is Polish, P◦f
−1 is regular, and hence f is tight in P(CNd+ ) (see, e.g., Remark 13.27
at p. 260 in [34]). This implies that the sequence {(f, L,An)}n∈N is tight in P(C
Nd
+ ×D
k×DNd↑ ).
By Prokhorov’s theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 13.29 at p. 261 in [34]), there exists a subse-
quence of indexes (still denoted by n) and a probability measure P¯ ∈ P(CNd+ ×D
k×DNd↑ ) such
that the sequence Pn converges weakly to P¯. The first claim of the theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Claim 2. Thanks to an extension of Skorokhod’s theorem for separable spaces
(see Theorem 3 in [20]), there exists a probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯), and, on it, a sequence
{(f¯n, L¯n, A¯n)}n∈N of C
Nd
+ × D
k × DNd↑ -valued random variables, and a C
Nd
+ × D
k × DNd↑ -
valued random variable (f¯ , L¯, A¯), such that Q¯ ◦ (f¯n, L¯n, A¯n)−1 = Pn and Q¯◦ (f¯ , L¯, A¯)−1 = P¯.
Furthermore, this representation is such that, for almost all ω ∈ Ω¯, we have
(4.9) f¯n(ω)→ f¯(ω) uniformly on the interval [0, T ],
as well as
(4.10) (L¯n(ω), A¯n(ω))→ (L¯(ω), A¯(ω)) in the measure dt+ δT on [0, T ].
Define then β¯ := (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯, f¯ , L¯). Since P ◦ (f, L)−1 is constantly P0, then the same holds for
its limit; that is, Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯)−1 = P0, and this implies that β¯ is a basis.
Next, for every i = 1, ...., N and n ∈ N, recalling (4.5), we define on the probability space
(Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯) the subgradient processes ∂C¯i,n := ∂Ci(f¯n, L¯n, A¯n) and ∂C¯i := ∂Ci(f¯ , L¯, A¯). By
the convergence at the terminal time (4.10) together with Fatou’s lemma and the estimate
(4.8) we have
(4.11) EQ¯[|A¯T |
q] ≤ sup
n
EQ¯[|A¯nT |
q] = sup
n
EP[|AnT |
q] <∞.
Let Q := ([0, T ) ∩Q) ∪ {T} and define the measurable function Φ : Dk → R by
Φ(X) := sup
t∈Q
|Xt|.
Being constantly equal to P ◦Φ(L)−1, the sequence {Q¯ ◦Φ(L¯n)−1}n∈N is tight in P(R
k). This
allows to assume without loss of generality (modulo a further subsequence, a new Skorokhod
representation of the sequence {(f¯n,Φ(L¯n), L¯n, A¯n)}n∈N, and exploiting the measurability of
Φ), that Φ(L¯n) converges to Φ(L¯), Q-a.s. Furthermore, by (4.3) in Assumption 4.1, we have
EQ¯[Φ(L¯)] = EP0 [Φ(πL)] <∞. The latter, together with the Q¯-a.s. convergence of Φ(L¯
n), the
convergence in (4.10), and the integrability proved in (4.11), implies that, for Q¯-almost all
ω ∈ Ω¯, there exists a constant M(ω) <∞ such that
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(|L¯nt (ω)|+ |A¯
n
t (ω)|+ |L¯t(ω)|+ |A¯t(ω)|) ≤M(ω).
Thus, for Q¯-almost all ω ∈ Ω, we can find, by continuity of hi, another constant K(ω) < ∞
such that
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
[
hi(L¯nt (ω), B¯
n
t (ω), A¯
−i,n
t (ω)) + h
i(L¯t(ω), B¯t(ω), A¯
−i
t (ω))
]
≤ K(ω).
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Hence, for Q¯-almost all ω ∈ Ω, the bounded continuous function ∇ih
i(l, a) ∧K(ω) coincides
with the function ∇ih
i(l, a) when evaluated along the sequence (L¯ns (ω), A¯
n
s (ω)) and at the
limit point (L¯s(ω), A¯s(ω)).
Considering ω fixed and ∇ih
i bounded by K(ω), this allows to use equation (A.1), together
with standard arguments exploiting the compactness of [0, T ], in order to deduce that, Q¯-a.s.
(4.12) lim
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∫ T
t
(
∇ih
i(L¯ns , A¯
n
s )−∇ih
i(L¯s, A¯s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
The latter, thanks to (4.9) and (4.10) and to the continuity of ∇ig
i, implies that,
(4.13) ∂C¯i,n → ∂C¯i uniformly on the interval [0, T ], for every i = 1, ..., N, Q¯-a.s.
The following claims summarize two key properties of the processes ∂C¯i and A¯ that will
guarantee that (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium as in Definition 4.
For every i = 1, ..., N , we now prove that the following hold Q¯-a.s.:
(2.a) ∂C¯it ≥ 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ];
(2.b)
∫
[0,T ]
∂C¯it dA¯
i
t = 0.
(Proof of 2.a) We begin by proving that ∂C¯n → ∂C¯ in L1(Q¯⊗ dt). For i = 1, ..., N , from the
convergence proved in (4.13) we have that Q¯⊗ dt-a.e. ∂C¯i,n converges to ∂C¯i. Moreover, for
p > 1 as in Assumption 4.1, by the growth condition (4.1) we easily find that
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∂C¯i,nt |
p
]
≤ C˜
(
1 + EP[|AnT |
γ2p] + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|(πL)t|
γ1p + |(πf )
i
t
|p
) ])
,(4.14)
for a suitable constant C˜. Using then the integrability condition (4.3) in Assumption 4.1 and
the estimates (4.8) (recall that by assumption γ2p < q), we have
(4.15) sup
n
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∂C¯i,nt |
p
]
<∞,
which implies that the sequence ∂C¯i,n is uniformly integrable. From Theorem 6.25 at p. in
[34], we deduce then that ∂C¯n → ∂C¯ in L1(Q¯ ⊗ dt). Now, from the second equation in (4.7)
in Lemma 4.2, we find
0 = lim
n
EP
[∫ T
0
(∂Ci,nt )
− dt
]
= lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
(∂C¯i,nt )
− dt
]
= EQ¯
[∫ T
0
(∂C¯it)
− dt
]
,
and by continuity of ∂C¯i we conclude that Q¯-a.s.
(4.16) ∂C¯it ≥ 0 , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ i = 1, ..., N.
(Proof of 2.b) Computations analogous to those employed in (4.14) yield
(4.17) EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∂C¯i,nt |
αp
]
≤ C˜
(
1+EP[|AnT |
αγ2p]+EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|(πL)t|
αγ1p + |(πf )
i
t
|αp
) ])
,
as well as,
(4.18) EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∂C¯it |
αp
]
≤ C˜
(
1 + EQ¯[|A¯T |
αγ2p] + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|(πL)t|
αγ1p + |(πf )
i
t
|αp
) ])
.
Now, the estimates (4.8), (4.11), (4.17) and (4.18) imply that
sup
n
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∂C¯i,nt |
αp + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∂C¯it |
αp + |A¯nT |
αp
p−1 + |A¯T |
αp
p−1
]
<∞,
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which, together with the convergence established in (4.13), allows us to use Lemma A.2 in
Appendix A in order to deduce that
(4.19) EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∂C¯it dA¯
i
t
]
= lim
n
EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∂C¯i,nt dA¯
i,n
t
]
= lim
n
EP
[ ∫ T
0
∂Ci,nt dA
i,n
t
]
≤ 0,
where we have used the first equality of (4.7) in Lemma 4.2 and that, for each n ∈ N, A¯i,n0 = 0
Q¯-a.s. This implies, thanks to the non negativity of ∂C¯i established in (4.16), that Q¯-a.s.∫
[0,T ]
∂C¯itdA¯
i
t = 0;
i.e. (2.b) is proved.
It does remain to conclude that the couple (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium of the game.
Fix i ∈ {1, ..., N}, and consider an admissible strategy Bi ∈ Aβ¯. By (4.6) and Claims (2.a)
and (2.b) we have
J i
β¯
(Bi, A¯−i)− J i
β¯
(A¯i, A¯−i) ≥ EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∂C¯it(dB
i
t − dA¯
i
t)
]
= EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
∂C¯itdB
i
t
]
≥ 0,
which in fact completes the proof. 
4.4. On Lipschitz ε-Nash Equilibria for the Monotone-Follower Game. In this sub-
section we prove another connection between the Lipschitz games and the monotone-follower
game by showing that ε-Nash equilibria of the monotone-follower game can be realized as
Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz game, for n sufficiently large. The proof of this result
exploits Theorem 4.3, combined with a contradiction scheme.
As in Subsection 4.3, in the following we consider fixed a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), and, for
each n ∈ N, let An = (A1,n, ..., AN,n) be a Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game as in
Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that Assumption 4.1 holds and that there exists a constant C > 0
such that
(4.20) |hi(l, a)| + |gi(l, a)| ≤ C(1 + |l|γ1 + |a−i|γ2),
for each l ∈ Rk and a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ RNd.
Then, for each ε > 0, there exists nε such that the Nash equilibrium A
nε of the nε-Lipschitz
game is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the monotone-follower game; that is, for each i = 1, ..., N
J iβ(A
i,nε , A−i,nε) ≤ J iβ(B
i, A−i,nε) + ε for each Bi ∈ Aβ.
Proof. We argue by contraddiction and we suppose that the thesis is false. Then, there exists
ε > 0 such that, for each n ∈ N, there exist in ∈ {1, ..., N} and an admissible strategy
Bn ∈ Aβ with
J inβ (A
n) > J inβ (B
n, A−in,n) + ε.
Since the number of indexes of the players is finite, we can suppose that there exists i ∈
{1, ..., N} such that, for each n ∈ N,
(4.21) J iβ(A
n) > J iβ(B
n, A−i,n) + ε.
Recall now that, for each n ∈ N, An is a Nash equilibrium for the n-Lipschitz game and notice
that the process constantly equal to zero is admissible. Hence, from (4.21), and using the
coercivity condition (4.4) and the integrability condition (4.2) in Assumption 4.1, we find
cEP[|BnT |] ≤ J
i
β(B
n, A−i,n) < J iβ(A
n)− ε
≤ J iβ(0, A
−i,n) ≤ EP0
[∫ T
0
H i((πL)t) dt+G
i((πL)T )
]
<∞,
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which implies that
(4.22) sup
n
EP[|BnT |] <∞.
With arguments analogous to those employed in the proof of Claim 1 of Theorem 4.3,
from the tightness condition (4.22) we deduce that there exists a subsequence of indexes (still
denoted by n) and a probability measure P˜ ∈ P(CNd+ ×D
k ×D
(1+N)d
↑ ) such that the sequence
P ◦ (f, L,Bn,An)−1 converges weakly to P˜.
Then, thanks again to an extension of Skorokhod’s theorem (see Theorem 3 in [20]), there
exists a probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯), and, on it, a sequence {(f¯n, L¯n, B¯n, A¯n)}n∈N of C
Nd
+ ×
Dk × D
(1+N)d
↑ -valued random variables, and a C
Nd
+ × D
k × D
(1+N)d
↑ -valued random variable
(f¯ , L¯, B¯, A¯), such that Q¯◦ (f¯n, L¯n, B¯n, A¯n)−1 = P˜n and Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, B¯, A¯)−1 = P˜. Furthermore,
this representation is such that, for Q¯-almost all ω ∈ Ω¯, we have
(4.23) f¯n(ω)→ f¯(ω) uniformly on the interval [0, T ],
as well as
(4.24) (L¯n(ω), B¯n(ω), A¯n(ω))→ (L¯(ω), B¯(ω), A¯(ω)) in the measure dt+ δT on [0, T ].
A rationale similar to that yelding (4.12) can be employed to show that, Q¯-a.s.,
lim
n
∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )(4.25)
=
∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, B¯t, , A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , B¯T , A¯
−i
T ),
where we have also used that hi and gi are continuous. Furthermore, thanks to the growth
condition (4.20), for p > 1 as in Assumption 4.1, we can find a suitable constant C˜ > 0 such
that
sup
n
EQ¯
[∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
∣∣∣∣p ](4.26)
≤ C˜ sup
n
(
1 + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|(πL)t|
γ1p
]
+ EP [|AnT |
γ2p]
)
<∞,
where the integrability of the right-hand side follows from Condition (4.3) and the estimate
(4.8). Finally, the limit in (4.25), together with the uniform integrability in (4.26), allows us
to conclude that
lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
]
(4.27)
= EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, B¯t, A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , B¯T , A¯
−i
T )
]
.
With a similar reasoning we also find
lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , A¯
i,n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , A¯
i,n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
]
(4.28)
= EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, A¯
i
t, A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , A¯
i
T , A¯
−i
T )
]
.
Moreover, Condition (4.3) yields
(4.29) sup
n
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|f¯nt |
αp + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|f¯t|
αp
]
= 2EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|(πf )t|
αp
]
<∞.
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The latter, together with (4.8) and (4.11), allows to use Lemma A.2 in Appendix A in order
to deduce that
lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
f¯ i,nt dA¯
i,n
t
]
= EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ it dA¯
i
t
]
,
which, together with (4.28), gives
(4.30) lim
n
J iβ(A
n) = J i
β¯
(A¯i, A¯−i).
Fix now M ∈ N and define the sequence of processes {B¯n,M}n∈N by B¯
n,M
t := B¯
n
t ∧M
as well as the process B¯Mt := B¯t ∧M . Observe that, for each n ∈ N, from (4.21) and the
definition of B¯n,M we have
(4.31)
J i
β¯
(A¯n) > EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
]
+ EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ i,nt dB¯
n,M
t
]
+ ε.
Moreover, notice that the convergence established in (4.24) implies that, Q¯-a.s., the sequence
{B¯n,M}n∈N converges to B¯
M in the measure dt+ δT on [0, T ].
Now, since the sequence {B¯n,M}n∈N is bounded by the constant M , we can use again
Lemma A.2 in Appendix A to deduce that
(4.32) lim
n
EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ i,nt dB¯
n,M
t
]
= EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ it dB¯
M
t
]
.
Hence, thanks to (4.30), (4.27) and (4.32), for each fixed M we can pass to the limit in the
inequality (4.31), in order to obtain that
J i
β¯
(A¯) ≥ EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, B¯t, A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , B¯T , A¯
−i
T )
]
+ EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ it dB¯
M
t
]
+ ε.
Finally, by the monotone convergence theorem, we can take the limit as M →∞ in the latter
inequality to deduce that
(4.33) J i
β¯
(A¯i, A¯−i) ≥ J i
β¯
(B¯, A¯−i) + ε.
On the other hand, the probability measure Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, A¯)−1 is an accumulation point of
the sequence P ◦ (f, L,An)−1, and hence, by Theorem 4.3, the couple (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash
equilibrium of the monotone-follower game, with β¯ := (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯, f¯ , L¯). Moreover, B¯ is an
admissible strategy associated to the basis β¯; this implies that
J i
β¯
(A¯i, A¯−i) ≤ J i
β¯
(B¯, A¯−i),
which, together with (4.33), leads to a contradiction, and thus completes the proof. 
Remark 4.5. Theorem 4.4 can also be understood in a different way. Fix a weak Nash
equilibrium (β¯, A¯) which is an accumulation point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of the
n-Lipschitz game on a fixed basis β, and define
V = (V1, ...,VN ) := (J 1
β¯
(A¯), ...,J N
β¯
(A¯)).
Then, V is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the monotone-follower game (see, e.g., Definition
2.7 in [12], or [38]), in the sense that, for each ε > 0, there exists Aε ∈ ANβ such that, for
each i = 1, ..., N , we have:
(1) J iβ(A
i,ε, A−i,ε) ≤ J iβ(B
i, A−i,ε) + ε for each Bi ∈ Aβ;
(2) |J iβ(A
ε)− V i| ≤ ε.
Moreover, Theorem 4.4 shows that the Nash equilibrium payoff V is such that, for each ε > 0,
the profile strategy Aε, which satisfies the conditions of the definition above, can be chosen as
a Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game, for n large enough.
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Remark 4.6. Notice that the submodularity conditions (2) and (3) in Assumption 2.2 are
not necessarily needed in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and 4.4. Indeed, only the requirement
that, for each n ∈ N, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the n-Lipschitz game is needed. The
latter games can be seen as stochastic differential games, where the set of strategies is the
set of progressively measurable stochastic processes ui : Ω × [0, T ] → [0, n]d, with degenerate
dynamics Ait =
∫ t
0 u
i
sds. This fact suggests that, whenever the submodularity requirement does
not hold, one might exploit, on a case by case basis, existence results on equilibria for sochastic
differential games (see, e.g., [14] and references therein for results on stochastic differential
games).
5. Applications and Examples
5.1. Existence of Equilibria in a Class of Stochastic Differential Games. This sub-
section is devoted to show that Theorem 2.3 applies to deduce existence of open loop Nash
equilibria in stochastic differential games with singular controls, whenever a certain structure
is preserved by the dynamics. For the sake of illustration, we propose the following model.
Fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) satisfying the usual conditions and consider on
it N standard F-Brownian motions W i. Suppose to be given, for i = 1, ..., N , measurable
functions gi, hi : Rk × RN → R, as well as constants µi, σi ∈ R and continuous F-adapted
stochastic processes f i : Ω × [0, T ] → [0,∞). Assume moreover to be given an F-adapted
process L : [0, T ] × Ω → Rk with ca`dla`g components. The set of admissible strategies A
is defined as the set of nondecreasing, nonnegative, ca`dla`g, F-adapted, R-valued stochastic
processes, whereas AN :=
⊗N
i=1A denotes the set of asmissible profile strategies.
We consider the N -player stochastic differential game of singular controls in which, for
i = 1, ..., N , player i chooses an admissible strategy ξi ∈ A to control her private state, which
evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
(5.1) dXit = µ
iXit dt+ σ
iXit dW
i
t + dξ
i
t, t ∈ [0, T ], X
i
0− = x
i
0 > 0,
in order to minimize her expected cost
J i(ξi, ξ−i) := E
[∫ T
0
hi(Lt,X
i
t ,X
−i
t )dt+ g
i(LT ,X
i
T ,X
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f itdξ
i
t
]
.
Observe that, for i = 1, ..., N , the solution to equation (5.1) is given by
(5.2) Xit = E
i
t
[
xi0 +
∫
[0,t]
1
Eis
dξis
]
= Eit
[
xi0 + ξ¯
i
t
]
,
where the processes {Eit}t∈[0,T ] and {ξ¯
i
t}t∈[0,T ] are defined by
(5.3) Eit := exp
[(
µi −
(σi)2
2
)
t+ σiW it
]
and ξ¯it :=
∫
[0,t]
1
Eis
dξis.
Assumption 5.1. Let hi and gi satisfy Assumption 2.2. Suppose moreover that:
(1) for each i = 1, ..., N , there exist functions H˜ i, G˜i : Rk × R→ [0,∞) such that
hi(l, xi, x−i) ≤ H˜ i(l, xi) and gi(l, xi, x−i) ≤ G˜i(l, xi), for each (l, x) ∈ Rk × RN ,
with
E
[∫ T
0
H˜ i(Lt, x0E
i
t) dt+ G˜
i(LT , x0E
i
T )
]
<∞;
(2) there exists a constant k1 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N , we have g
i(l, x) ≥ k1x
i for
each (l, x) ∈ Rk × RN .
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Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption 5.1, there exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the
previously introduced stochastic differential game.
Proof. Thanks to (5.2), the cost functional of player i can be rewritten in terms of ξ¯i (cf.
(5.3)), that is
J i(ξi, ξ−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
hi
(
Lt, E
i
t
[
xi0 + ξ¯
i
t
]
,
{
Ejt
[
xj0 + ξ¯
j
t
]}
j 6=i
)
dt(5.4)
+ gi
(
LT , E
i
T
[
xi0 + ξ¯
i
T
]
,
{
EjT
[
xj0 + ξ¯
j
T
]}
j 6=i
)
+
∫
[0,T ]
f itE
i
t dξ¯
i
t
]
.
This leads to define the new functions h¯i, g¯i : Rk × (0,∞)N × RN → [0,∞) by
h¯i(l, e, zi, z−i) := hi(l, ei[xi0 + z
i], {ej [xj0 + z
j ]}j 6=i)
g¯i(l, e, zi, z−i) := gi(l, ei[xi0 + z
i], {ej [xj0 + z
j ]}j 6=i),
as well as the continuous processes f¯ i : Ω× [0, T ]→ R by f¯ it := f
i
t E
i
t . These definitions allows
us to introduce new cost functionals in terms of new profile strategies ζ = (ζ1, ..., ζN ) ∈ AN
setting
J¯ i(ζ i, ζ−i) := E
[ ∫ T
0
h¯i(Lt, Et, ζ
i
t , ζ
−i
t )dt+ g¯
i(LT , ET , ζ
i
T , ζ
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f¯ itdζ
i
t
]
.
Notice that, by (5.4) and the definition of ξ¯i in (5.3) as a function of ξi, we have that
J¯ i(ξ¯i, ξ¯−i) = J i(ξi, ξ−i), ∀ ξ ∈ AN , ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Furthermore, for each ζ ∈ AN there exists a unique ξ ∈ AN such that ζ i = ξ¯i for each
i ∈ {1, ..., N}. This means that solving the stochastic differential game in the class of profile
strategies ξ ∈ A and with cost functionals J i is equivalent to solve the monotone-follower
game for ζ ∈ A and cost functionals J¯ i. The rest of the proof is then mainly devoted to show
that the costs h¯i and g¯i, together with the processes f¯ i, satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.3.
Since the functions hi and gi satisfy Assumption 2.2, for each (l, e, z−i) ∈ Rk × (0,∞)N ×
RN−1 the functions h¯i(l, e, ·, z−i) and g¯i(l, e, ·, z−i) are clearly continuous and strictly convex.
Moreover, for (l, e) ∈ Rk × (0,∞)N and z, z¯ ∈ RN such that z ≤ z¯, we have ej [xj0 + z
j ] ≤
ej [xj0 + z¯
j ] for each j = 1, ..., N , since the components of e are positive. Therefore, because
hi has decreasing differences, we deduce that
h¯i(l, e, z¯i, z−i)− h¯i(l, e, zi, z−i)
= hi(l, ei[xi0 + z¯
i], {ej [xj0 + z
j]}j 6=i)− h
il, (ei[xi0 + z
i], {ej [xj0 + z
j]}j 6=i)
≥ hi(l, ei[xi0 + z¯
i], {ej [xj0 + z¯
j]}j 6=i)− h
i(l, ei[xi0 + z
i], {ej [xj0 + z¯
j]}j 6=i)
= h¯i(l, e, z¯i, z¯−i)− h¯i(l, e, zi, z¯−i),
which means that h¯i has decreasing difference as well. In the same way it is possible to show
that g¯i has decreasing differences, and this allows to conclude that the functions h¯i and g¯i
satisfy Assumption 2.2. Moreover, thanks to (1) in Assumption 5.1, Condition 2.6 is clearly
satisfied with ri(ζ) = 0 for each ζ ∈ AN .
We prove now that the functionals J¯ i satisfy a slightly different version of Condition 2.5.
The superlinear condition (2) in Assumption 5.1 implies that
J¯ i(ζ i, ζ−i) ≥E
[
g¯i(LT , ζ
i
T , ζ
−i
T )
]
= E
[
gi
(
LT , E
i
T
[
xi0 + ζ
i
T
]
,
{
EjT
[
xj0 + ζ
j
T
]}
j 6=i
)]
≥ k1E
[
EiT
[
xi0 + ζ
i
T
]]
≥ k1E
[
EiT ζ
i
T
]
= k1 E[E
i
T ]E
P˜i
[
ζ iT
]
,
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where P˜i is the probability measure on (Ω,F) given by
dP˜i :=
EiT
E[EiT ]
dP,
and equivalent to P.
We can therefore apply Theorem 2.3 (in fact a slightly different version of it, in which the
expectation in Condition 2.5 is replaced by the expectation under an equivalent probability
measure) to deduce existence of a Nash equilibrium ζˆ = (ζˆ1, ..., ζˆN ) of the monotone-follower
game with cost functionals J¯ i. Hence the process ξˆ = (ξˆ1, ..., ξˆN ) defined by
ξˆit :=
∫
[0,t]
Eis dζˆ
i
s
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the stochastic differential game. 
Remark 5.3. The same arguments employed in the proof of Theorem 5.2 apply if we replace
the dynamics of the controlled geometric Brownian motion in (5.1) by the dynamics of a
controlled Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process
dXit = θ
i(µi −Xit) dt+ σ
i dW it + dξ
i
t, t ∈ [0, T ], X
i
0− = x
i
0 > 0,
for some parameters θi, σi > 0 and µi ∈ R. Mean-reverting dynamics (as the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
one) find important application in the energy and commodity markets (see, e.g., [8] or Chapter
2 in [40]).
5.2. An Algorithm to Approximate the Least Nash Equilibrium. In this subsection
we prove that, also in our setting, the algorithm introduced by Topkis (see Algorithm II in
[47]) for submodular games converges to the least Nash equilibrium of the game.
According to the notation of Section 2, define the sequence of processes {Rn}n∈N ⊂ A
N in
the following way:
• R0 = 0 ∈ AN ;
• for each n ≥ 1, set Rn+1 := R(Rn).
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 2.3 hold. Assume, moreover, that
there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
(5.5)
hi(l, a) + gi(l, a) ≤ C(1 + |a|), ∀ (l, a) ∈ Rk × RNd and |f it | ≤ C, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
Then the sequence {Rn}n∈N is monotone increasing in the lattice (A
N ,4N ) and it converges
to the least Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Since the map R : AN → AN is increasing (cf. Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2.3),
the sequence {Rn}n∈N is clearly monotone increasing with respect to the order relation in
AN .
Define now the process S := (S1, ..., SN ) ∈ AN∞ as the least upper bound of the sequence
{Rn}n∈N in the lattice (A
N
∞,4
N ). Recall the construction of S and S˜ (cf. (2.18) and (2.19) in
Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 2.3). Notice that, since the sequence {Rn}n∈N is increasing
in the lattice (AN ,4N ), there exists a P-null set N such that
S˜q(ω) = lim
n
Rnq (ω) = sup
n
Rnq (ω), ∀ q ∈ Q := ([0, T ] ∩Q) ∪ {T}, ∀ω ∈ Ω \ N .
Take now t¯ ∈ (0, T ) and ω ∈ Ω \ N . If Rn
t¯
(ω) does not converge to St¯(ω), then we find ε > 0
such that,
S˜q(ω) + ε = sup
n
Rnq (ω) + ε ≤ sup
n
Rnt¯ (ω) + ε ≤ St¯(ω).
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for each q ∈ Q such that q < t¯. This implies that St¯−(ω) + ε ≤ St¯(ω), which means that t¯ is
in the set I(ω) of discontinuity points of S(ω). Thus, we conclude that there exists a P-null
set N such that,
(5.6) St(ω) = lim
n
Rnt (ω) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] \ I(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω \ N ,
since, for each ω ∈ Ω \ N , the latter convergence is verified in T by the definition of ST .
We next show that the limit point S is a Nash equilibrium. By Step 1 in the proof of
Theorem 2.3, we know that there exists a suitable constant C˜ such that, for each n ∈ N,
E[|RnT |] ≤ C˜. Hence, by the monotone convergence theorem, we deduce that
(5.7) E[|ST |] ≤ C˜,
which in turn implies that S ∈ AN . Fix then i ∈ {1, ..., N} and Bi ∈ A. If E[|BiT |] =∞, then,
by the coercivity condition (2.5), we would automatically have J i(Si, S−i) ≤ J i(Bi, S−i) =
∞. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that
(5.8) E[|BiT |] <∞.
Now, since Ri,n+1 minimizes J i(·, R−i,n), for each n ∈ N we can write
E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, R
i,n+1
t , R
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , R
i,n+1
T , R
−i,n
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dR
i,n+1
t
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, B
i
t , R
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , B
i
T , R
−i,n
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dB
i
t
]
.
Moreover, the limit in (5.6), together with conditions (5.5) and the estimates (5.7) and (5.8),
allows us to invoke the dominated convergence theorem and to take the limit as n goes to
infinity in the last inequality in order to deduce that J i(Si, S−i) ≤ J i(Bi, S−i). Hence S is
a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we prove that S is the least Nash equilibrium. Suppose that S¯ is another Nash
equilibrium. By definition we have R0 = 0 4N S¯. If, for an arbitrary n ∈ N, we have
Rn 4N S¯, then, since the map R is increasing and S¯ is a fixed point of R, we have Rn+1 =
R(Rn) 4N R(S¯) = S¯. Hence, by induction, we deduce that Rn 4N S¯ for each n ∈ N, which
in turn implies that S 4N S¯, since S is the least upper bound of the sequence {Rn}n∈N. 
Appendix A. Meyer-Zheng Convergence
In this appendix we recall some fact about the so-called Meyer-Zheng topology (see [42])
and we provide some results concerning the tightness of ca`dla`g processes in such a topology.
Pseudopath topology. Recall that we have defined (cf. Subsection 4.3) the pseudopath
topology τTpp on the space D
m as the topology induced by the convergence in the measure
dt + δT on the interval [0, T ], where dt denotes the Lebesgue measure and δT denotes the
Dirac measure at the terminal point T . Notice that we introduce the pseudo-path topology
through its characterization proved in Lemma 1 in [42]. Observe that the topology τTpp is
metrizable. If {xn}n∈N is a sequence of functions in D
m converging to a function x ∈ Dm in
the pseudopath topology τTpp, then we have that (see, e.g., Appendix A.3. at p. 116 in [37])
(A.1) lim
n
∫ T
0
φ(s, xns ) ds =
∫ T
0
φ(s, xs) ds, and lim
n
xnT = xT ,
for each bounded continuous function φ : [0, T ]× Rm → R.
Meyer-Zheng topology and tightness criteria. The Meyer-Zheng topology on P(Dm) is the
topology of weak convergence of probability measures on the topological space (Dm, τTpp).
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For a given filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) consider a ca`dla`g process X : Ω× [0, T ]→
Rm, and consider the conditional variation of X over the interval [0, T ], defined as
(A.2) V PT (X) := sup
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣E[Xti −Xti−1 |Fti−1 ]∣∣]+ E[|Xtn |],
where the supremum is taken over all the partitions 0 = t0 < ... < tn ≤ T , n ∈ N.
We finally prove, for the sake of completeness, a slightly different version of the classical
Meyer-Zheng tightness criterion (see Theorem 4 at p. 360 in [42]), that is useful in many
occasions during our study. Notice that, differently to Theorem 34 at p. 116 in [37], the next
lemma allows us to handle a stochastic cost of control f .
Lemma A.1. The following tightness criteria hold true.
(1) Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of R
m-valued ca`dla`g processes defined on [0, T ] such that
sup
n
V PT (X
n) <∞.
Then {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(D
m).
(2) Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of nondecreasing, nonnegative, R
m-valued ca`dla`g processes
defined on [0, T ] such that
sup
n
E[|XnT |] <∞.
Then {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(D
m
↑ ).
Proof. We will prove only the claim (1), since the proof of claim (2) follows by an analogous
rationale.
Let Dm[0,∞) be the space of Rm-valued ca`dla`g functions on [0,∞), with the Borel σ-
algebra generated by the Skorokhod topology. On the half line [0,∞), consider the measure
λ given by dλ := e−tdt. On Dm[0,∞) consider the pseudopath topology τpp; that is, the
topology induced by the convergence in the measure λ on the interval [0,∞). Define, moreover,
the space D˜m[0,∞) as the set of elements of Dm[0,∞) which are constant on [T,∞), and
notice that D˜m[0,∞) is a closed subset of Dm[0,∞). Also, observe that the extension map
Ψ : Dm → D˜m[0,∞), defined by
(A.3) Ψ(x)t :=
{
xt if t ∈ [0, T ]
xT if t ∈ (T,∞),
is an omeomorphism between the topological spaces (Dm, τTpp) and (D˜
m[0,∞), τpp).
Now, using the uniform boundedness of V PT (X
n), we notice that the sequence Ψ(Xn) sat-
isfies the requirement of Theorem 4 in [42], and, as shown in its proof, it follows that the
sequence {P ◦ Ψ(Xn)}n∈N is tight in P(D
m[0,∞)). Furthermore, since D˜m[0,∞) is a closed
subset of Dm[0,∞), we have that {P ◦Ψ(Xn)}n∈N is tight in P(D˜
m[0,∞)). Finally, since the
map Ψ is an omeomorphism, we conclude that the sequence {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(D
m)
in the Meyer-Zheng topology. 
We finally summarize in a lemma a result on the convergence of stochastic integrals.
Lemma A.2. Let {Fn}n∈N be a sequence of R
m-valued continuous processes which converges
P-a.s. to an Rm-valued continuous process F uniformly on [0, T ]. Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence
of nondecreasing, nonnegative, Rm-valued ca`dla`g processes defined on [0, T ], which converges
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P-a.s. to nondecreasing, nonnegative, Rm-valued cadlag process X in the pseudopath topology
τTpp. Suppose, moreover, that there exists two constant α, p > 1 such that
(A.4) sup
n
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(|Fnt |
αp + |Ft|
αp) + |XnT |
αp
p−1 + |XT |
αp
p−1
]
<∞.
Then
(A.5) lim
n
E
[∫
[0,T ]
Fnt dX
n
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dXt
]
.
Proof. We will prove that for each subsequence of indexes there exists a further subsequence
for which the limit in (A.5) holds true.
Consider then a subsequence of indexes (not relabeled). From Condition (A.4), Ho¨lder’s
inequality with p as in the assumptions easily reveals that
(A.6) sup
n
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,T ]
Fnt dX
n
t
∣∣∣∣α ]+ sup
n
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,T ]
FtdX
n
t
∣∣∣∣α ] <∞.
Since α > 1, by the reflexivity of Lα(P), there exists a subsequence of indexes nj and a random
variable Z ∈ Lα(P), for which
(A.7) lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
F
nj
t dX
nj
t
]
= lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dX
nj
t
]
= E[Z],
where the equality of the two limits follows from the P-a.s. uniform convergence of Fn to F
and from the integrability condition (A.4).
Next, since by Condition (A.4) the sequence {X
nj
T }j∈N is bounded in L
1(P), by Lemma 3.5
in [30] there exist a nondecreasing, nonnegative, Rm-valued ca`dla`g process B defined on [0, T ]
and a subsequence (not relabeled) of {Xnj}j∈N such that, P-a.s.,
(A.8) lim
m
∫
[0,T ]
ϕtdB
m
t =
∫
[0,T ]
ϕtdBt ∀ϕ ∈ Cb([0, T ];R
d) and lim
m
BmT = BT ,
where we have set, P-a.s.
(A.9) Bmt :=
1
m
m∑
j=1
X
nj
t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, for ϕ ∈ C∞c ([0, T );R
d), the limit in (A.8) and an integration by parts, together
with the limit in (A.1) (observing that the sequence {|XnT |}n∈N is P-a.s. bounded), imply
that, P-a.s.,∫
[0,T ]
ϕtdBt = lim
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
∫
[0,T ]
ϕtdX
nj
t = − lim
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
∫ T
0
X
nj
t ϕ
′
tdt =
∫
[0,T ]
ϕtdXt.
Therefore, by the fundamental lemma of the Calculus of Variation (see Theorem 1.24 at p.
26 in [17]), the right-continuity of X and B, and the convergence of X
nj
T to XT , we have
Bt = Xt for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. This identification allows to conclude, using (A.7) and
uniform integrability estimates as in (A.6), that
E[Z] = lim
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dX
nj
t
]
= lim
m
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dB
m
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dXt
]
.
The latter, combined with (A.7), completes the proof of the lemma. 
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